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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[
Heddles v. Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co., 74 Wis. 239, 42 N.W. 237 (1889) (remitting
the "unreasonable excess"). The Wisconsin court has conceded that this practice
might result in impairing the defendant's right to a trial by jury guaranteed
under the state constitution. Heinmlich v. Tabor, 123 Wis. 365, 102 N.W. 10
(1904). And the accepted practice in Wisconsin now seems to be for the court
to set the upper and lower limits within which the court would permit a jury to
fix the amount, and to give the plaintiff the option to accept the lowest figure and
to deny the defendant a new trial, [Stangarone v. Jacobs, 188 Wis. 20, 205 N.W.
318 (1925); Foreman v. Milw. Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 214 Wis. 259, 252 N.W.
588 (1934)], and at the same time to give the defendant the option, in lieu of
a new trial, of consenting to an entry of a judgment against him in an amount
equal to the highest figure as set by the court. Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270,
248 N.W. 127 (1933) ; Guth v. Fischer, 213 Wis. 323, 251 N.W. 223 (1933) ; see,
Ruepping v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 123 Wis. 319, 326, 101 N.W. 710 (1904).
The verdict may be further modified by the appellate court but that court must
always give the party so prejudiced the option of a re-trial. Campbell v. Sutliff,
193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927); Borowicz v. Hamann, 193 Wis. 324, 214 N.W.
374 (1927). The practice in Wisconsin may result in a denial of a retrial as to
damages. However the court, at the same time, is careful to have placed the
party affected in the most favorable position in which a jury on re-trial would
be permitted to have placed him. In cases where the damages are unliquidated,
as in the principal case, an assessment (or guess) by the jury between limits
determined by the court, (see Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann,
(supra), is the essence of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant case the rec-
ord does not disclose the extent of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff; there
is nothing in the record to show that the abridged award represented the great-
est sum a jury in its discretion might be permitted to award and in fact consti-
tuted an invasion by the trial court into the province of the jury.
ROBERT P. HARLAND.
CARRIERS-VALIDITY OF LIMITATION CLAUSE.-Three shipments of cherries,
in all 4,266 barrels, were loaded in Italian ports and shipped with the defendant
carrier, consigned to the plaintiff in New York. Due to improper stowage, the
cargo arrived in bad condition. One hundred and sixty-two barrels were a total
loss and there was damage to the others amounting to an entire loss of 581 bar-
rels. The remaining portion of the cargo was sold for a price exceeding the
value stated in the invoice plus the freight. This claim is made for the damaged
portion of the cargo. The defendant carrier resists liability for damage to this
portion because of a stipulation in the bill of lading which provided "that if,
after deduction of all loss and damage, the remaining cargo, in its then condi-
tion, is worth more at destination than the entire cargo was worth at the time and
place of shipment, the carrier should be exonerated from liability for the dam-
aged portion." Held, the valuation clause here employed is unreasonable and
contrary to public policy even if supported by a valid consideration. The Ansaldo
San Giorgio I, 55 Sup. Ct. 483 (1935).
At the common law carriers were held to the strictest degree of liability,
being responsible for loss and damage of goods carried except in the case of
destruction by Acts of God or the public enemy. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.
908, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1702). The late Justice Holmes disputes the assumption
that this rule was settled prior to Lord Holt's decision. See Holmes, THE COM-
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MON LAW (1881) 180. The strict common law liability was later relaxed to ex-
cuse performance by the carrier for losses due to the exercise of public author-
ity, the fault of the shipper, and the inherent vice in the thing shipped. Goddard,
Liability of Common Carriers (1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 399. Up to the year 1848,
the strictest liability was imposed on common carriers in the United States. At
that time the Supreme Court through Justice Nelson rendered a decision in
favor of a common carrier limiting this strict liability by agreement between
the parties. See New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How.
344,382, 12 L.ed. 465 (1848). This doctrine was modified twenty-five years later by
a case holding that a common carrier could limit its common law liability if the
agreement -were fair and reasonable. Almost any agreement except one releasing
the carrier from liability for its own negligence or that of its servants was held
reasonable. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L.ed. 627 (1872).
In a few jurisdictions the common carrier has been permitted to release itself
by agreement from liability for its negligence. In Illinois for example the car-
rier by contract with the shipper may be liable only for gross negligence.
Wabash R. R. Co. v. Brown, 152 Ill. 484, 39 N.E. 274 (1894). In England the re-
laxation of the strict liability rule brought about a condition resulting in an in-
creased number of accidents. Goddard, Liability of Common Carriers, supra.
The carrier at that time could limit its liability by notice to the shipper. Gibbon
v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298, 98 Eng. Rep. 199 (1769). The United States cases
rejected this "notification doctrine." Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 32 Am. Dec.
470; (N.Y. 1838); Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, 32 Am. Dec. 455 (N.Y.
1838). To eliminate the doctrine of "notification" the Railway and Canal Act
was passed in England. 17 & 18 Vicr. c. 31, § 7 (1854). In the absence of a valid
stipulation to the contrary, a common carrier's liability for the loss or damage
to goods in transit is measured by the market value of the goods at destination
in the condition in which they should have arrived. ROBERTS, CARRIERS (2nd ed.
1929) 391. This measure of damages may be reduced by a valid stipulation that
in case of injury to the goods a certain fixed value for the goods shall be the
basis of the damages. Hart v. Pa. R. R., 112 U.S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L.ed.
717 (1884). However, he cannot contract for relief from all liability for his
own negligence, even though he give a special consideration for that effect. See
Boston & Maine R. R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439, 444, 38 Sup. Ct. 354, 62 L.ed. 820
(1917); Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 23 L.ed. 872
(1876). The damages are computed in the regular way, but if they exceed the
stipulation, no recovery for the excess may be had. See Duplan Silk Co. v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 223 Fed. 600, 603 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1915). In order to make such an
agreement enforceable, consideration in the form of a lower rate must be
granted to the shipper. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 Sup.
Ct. 148, 57 L. ed. 314 (1913). In some instances carriers have stipulated that
damages for injury to goods shall be computed on the invoice value; this is a
true valuation clause. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & Western Trans. Co., 117
U.S. 312, 322, 3 Sup. Ct. 750, 29 L.ed. 908 (1885) ; Gulf Colo. Ry. Co. v. Texas
Packing Co., 244 U.S. 31, 36, 37 Sup. Ct 487, 61 L.ed. 970 (1916). In federal cases
alternative rates seem to be necessary in order to make the valuation clause valid.
See Western Transit Co. v. A. C. Leslie & Co., 242 U.S. 448, 453, 37 Sup. Ct.
133, 61 L.ed. 423 (1916). The weight of authority in state courts holds that no
choice of rates need be offered to the shipper in order to uphold the
validity, of such clauses. Gratiot St. Warehouse Co. v. Mo. K. & T. R.
124 Mo. App. 545, 102 S.W. 11 (1907); Grubbs v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
101 S.C. 210, 85 S.E. 405 (1915). The limitation clause in the instant case was
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held void and against public policy in the lower court because its effect was to
relieve the carrier from the consequences of its own negligence, i.e., though
some goods might be lost, if the remainder brought a price equal to the in-
voice value of the whole the carrier would not pay any damages for the lost or
injured articles. The Ansaldo San Giorgio I., 73 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1934).
The liability of a common carrier for goods lost through negligence is not merely
a breach of contract, it is also tortious. See Pearse v. Quebec, 24 Fed. 285, 287
(S.D. N.Y. 1885). If the invoice price is used as a basis of determining the
damages on each article injured this would not be against public policy. See The
M1erauke, 31 F. (2d) 974 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1929).
The carrier is responsible for each item of the cargo, and thus in case of in-
jury to any item damages must be paid by the carrier. While by valid stipulation
these damages may be limited to the invoice price, this must be interpreted to
mean the invoice price of each unit and not of the cargo as a whole. To permit
the carrier to offset the increment in value at point of destination against the
partial loss sustained through damage in transit, is to deprive the shipper of
his profit, a rightful incident of commerce.
OLIVER H. BASSUENER.
CoNSTrruTioNAL LAW-CODEs-DELEATION OF PowER.-The plaintiff, a retail
automobile dealer, seeks to restrain the defendant administrative officials of the
Wisconsin Motor Vehicle Retailing Code from enforcing. the provisions thereof.
The code was adopted under Chapter 110 of the Wisconsin Statutes 1933, en-
titled Emergency Promotion of Industrial Recovery, which provides that, if a
preponderant majority of any trade or industry submits a code of fair compe-
tition, the governor upon finding it to conform to certain specifications may
give it the force of law. The plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of the code
and the constitutionality of Chapter 110 on four grounds: 1) the exemptions
granted code industries from prosecution under the anti-trust laws is unreason-
ably discriminatory; 2) the plaintiff is prevented from carrying on a lawful
business in a lawful manner; 3) prices are regulated in an industry not affected
with the public interest; and, 4) there is an unauthorized delegation of power.
The trial court found the chapter constitutional. On appeal, Held, the chapter is
a clearly unauthorized delegation -of legislative power. Gibson Auto Co. Inc., v.
Finnegan, Aty. Gen., et al., (Wis. 1935) 259 N.W. 420.
Section I of Article IV of the Wisconsin Constitution, providing that legisla-
tive power be vested in a senate and assembly, is interpreted to mean that the
legislature must determine whether or not there shall be a law. State ex rel. Wis-
consin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928). There
is no clause in Chapter 110 giving the governor a power comparable to that given
the President in the national act [48 STAT. 199 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. .§ 703 (d)
(1934] to formulate and impose a code of fair competition on a reluctant industry
which has not voluntarily come forward with one. Thus the basic determination
as fo whether or not there shall be a code, which is no less than a law for a par-
ticular industry, rests with the preponderant-majority of the industry, and upon
this fundamental defect the entire chapter is declared unconstitutional. The court
in the instant case refers to Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 79 L.ed.
223 (1935), as throwing some light on the subject, but it must be pointed out
that the unauthorized delegation in that case was to a definite person (the
President), and was illegal because it was unlimited, while in the instant case
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